What do you think Aristotle means when he says that “matters concerned with conduct and questions of what is good for us have no fixity”? Do you agree with this statement?
In my opinion, what Aristotle means is that what is good and what is bad are not permanent things. As seen in his description of moral virtues, individuals have an intrinsic want to do the right thing (Shafer-Landau 92). Therefore, when they do the right thing, they are aware, and when they do the wrong thing, they are also aware. But that does not mean that right and wrong should be permanent. Some situations arise when one may do something that is deemed wrong but, in a situation, where it appears right. Therefore, I agree with Aristotle. There are several moments in life when one is faced with a moral dilemma. However, by being rational, one can identify circumstances that require one to compromise their moral ideals in favor of doing the right thing even if it may appear wrong.
What advice does Aristotle give regarding how we should go about seeking the mean between extremes? Do you think this is good advice?
Aristotle says that when seeking the mean, one has to find that most contrary to it. Aristotle suggests this because he finds that as human beings, we find it difficult to remain virtuous. For instance, we tend to over-indulge more that we exercise temperance (Shafer-Landau 146). However, we find it hard to maintain propriety, which keeps us from over-indulging or exercising full temperance. Therefore, as a solution, Aristotle suggests that when you want to achieve the mean, pick that which is not virtuous and then do what is most contrary to it (Shafer-Landau 146). That way, you will keep yourself from doing the wrong thing. I do believe that this is good advice from Aristotle. The reason is that when you look at people who have been used to over-indulging on alcohol, some of them choose to abstain from drinking completely by joining support groups or through self-discipline. Among these individuals, their decision to quit drinking helps them achieve the mean because they do what is most contrary to over-indulgence on alcohol.
Thompson claims that the notion of a “right to life” cannot be interpreted as the right to the “bare minimum one needs for continued life.” Why does she claim this? What, according to Thompson, does having a right to life amount to? Do you agree with her about this?
Thompson claims this because, in her view, the right to life is dependent on the individual. She provides a perfect example of the case of abortion. Here, she argues that a fetus’s right to life cannot be compared to a mother’s right to life. One has to trump the other, and in Thompson’s view, the mother’s trumps the fetus’ (Shafer-Landau 340). A fetus cannot simply be granted the right to life as a bare minimum for continued life because the mother’s rights are also paramount.
According to Thompson, having a right to life is conditional. For instance, in her illustration with the plugged violinist, Thompson argues that if you are forced to help a dying violinist by having your kidneys plugged to his, then there is a limit to the violinist’s right to life (Shafer-Landau 336). I agree with her because you would not be obligated to let the violinist live. You can choose to have yourself unplugged because, in Thompson’s view, the violinist’s right to life is limited, and having yourself unplugged is not killing him but letting him die.
Why doesn’t Thompson think that abortion always involves unjust killing? What does the justice of abortion depend on, according to Thompson?
Because abortion, according to Thompson, always involves what you should do or what you ought to do. What you should do is normally the decent thing, which is keeping the fetus. But what you ought to do is what you have the right to do but is not decent, which is to abort. Thompson finds that differentiating the two acts is important because it is the basis for arguing why abortion does not involve unjust killing (Shafer-Landau 344). Doing what you ought to do, even though not decent, is letting the fetus die but not killing it. Hence, it is for this reason that Thompson asserts that the justice of abortion depends on letting die.