The Utility of Intelligence State Fusion Centers by Local Law Enforcement after the September 11, 2001, Attack
Introduction
State and regional intelligence fusion centers in the United States existed long before the post-September 11 2001 terrorist attack (Cooney, Rojek & Kaminski (2011).For instance, the El Paso Intelligence Center was established in the 1970s to create information and intelligence sharing regarding drug enforcement and border security (Cooney et al. , 2011). However, the term fusion centers entered the lexicon of law enforcement and homeland security following the response to the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001. Since then, the number of fusion centers has increased in the country and has received significant political support at the federal level. According to Cooney et al. (2011), the desire to improve the coordination and information sharing, coupled with the political backing that the fusion centers received at the federal level resulted in the provision of $300 million funding by the Department of Homeland Security to support the development of fusion centers. More funding to support the formation of these centers have been released by both the state and local governments (Cooney et al., 2011).
The primary purpose of establishing intelligence fusion centers was to bridge the communication and collaboration gaps that existed among security agencies at all levels of government. The fusion centers were established to help in streamlining the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information and criminal intelligence. The U.S. Departments of Justice and Homeland Security provide an outline of the services that fusion centers should offer (Pherson & Sullivan Jr., 2013). Regarding the functions that relate to the homeland department, the fusion centers should establish a system for information and intelligence sharing between federal, state, and local security agencies on homeland security-related issues. Secondly, the fusion centers should establish an analytical process for evaluating threats and issues related to their respective jurisdictions. To accomplish these objectives of streamlined communication and sharing of critical intelligence information, they are required to develop a system that will disseminate warnings and other notifications to law enforcement and security agencies in the country (Cooney et al., 2011).
Fusion centers should also develop their own data sources and analytical tools that they will utilize to undertake security risk assessments, threat identification, vulnerability, and the potential consequences of those security threats. Since 2001, fusion centers have shifted their approach, which primarily focused on counterterrorism to a broader focus on addressing both terrorism and criminal activities within their jurisdictions. Therefore, these centers have an all crimes focus and facilitate information and intelligence exchange with state and local agencies in all communities; those who view terrorism as their primary concern and those that are less concerned with terrorist activities and their major concern is general criminal activities (Cooney et al., 2011).
Although the fusion centers were established to effectively minimize physical and technical barriers that undermine the sharing and processing of criminal intelligence, several criticisms have been directed to them in the last decade. Cooney et al. (2011) claim that some security experts and scholars have criticized the fusion centers as black holes where information goes in, but there is little effective communication that comes out. Other scholars have associated the inefficiencies in these fusion centers as hindered by organizational differences, including inter-agency competition and technical incompatibilities (Cooney et al., 2011). These observations and findings present a question on how effective these fusion centers are to serve the purpose they were established to undertake. With such criticism, one would ask; does local law enforcement officers prevent crime in the country by utilizing intelligence provided by the fusion centers? This research paper will argue utilizing intelligence provided by fusion centers by local law enforcement officers after September 11, 2001, has improved security.
Review of the Literature
Since their role entered the lexicon of law enforcement and homeland security after the 2001 attack, fusion centers have been utilized by the local and state law enforcement officers to enhance security in the country. Numerous literature has supported the positive impact fusion centers have had since their security approach was widened. In contrast, others have criticized the centers for failure to serve the objectives they were established to undertake.
According to Newbill (2008), fusion centers have been actively involved in intelligence sharing and cybersecurity by providing the federal government with centralized cybersecurity coordination and readiness as required by the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7. The National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) works closely with public and private security agencies to secure the country’s cyberspace 24 hours a day, 7 days a week (Newbill, 2008). This coordination between the fusion centers and both public and private security agencies ensures risk analysis is conducted effectively, resources are prioritized, and protective measures are taken appropriately to secure the country’s cyberspace.
Cyber risk management programs, which include promoting an annual national awareness is held every October, bringing together all government and private agencies. These programs involve the implementation of software assurance programs, conducting cyber exercise code, and deploying the Einstein network monitoring program. The cyber storm exercise is carried out every two years to evaluate how our security agencies are prepared to respond effectively to cyber issues of national concern (Newbill, 2008). Through the cyber storm, federal, state, and local governments can know how appropriately they are to address cyber threats and take necessary measures to make improvements where needed. The Einstein program is an intrusion detecting system that was implemented in 2004 and installed to monitor, record automatically, and analyze the flow of traffic (Newbill, 2008). This allows the Department of Homeland land officials to identify any abnormalities that may represent potential hackers or intruders.
Studies have also associated the absence of large scale successful attacks on the United States soil with the achievements that fusion centers have realized since 2001 (Devine & Capstone, 2014). The scholars who support the implementation of state and local fusion centers have argued that information sharing of the previous decades was inadequate in protecting the Americans against terror attacks and that today’s situation has been made effective in thwarting criminal activities. Devine & Capstone (2014) argue that although there are considerate risks to the increase of information sharing due to potential leaks of classified data and data oversaturation, supporters of the implementation of state and local fusion centers argue that the risk of not sharing critical security information and compromising the lives of the people is far greater.
Further, literature has applauded the role that fusion centers played in thwarting the University of Illinois Shooting Plot in January 2008 (Devine & Capstone, 2014). The Illinois Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center received a tip regarding a citizen of Virginia who was in route to the University of Illinois to gun down a female student and her boyfriend. The attacker wanted to open fire on the campus after murdering the two students. However, the fusion center in Illinois worked in collaboration with the fusion center in Virginia to generate and disseminate an intelligence alert to state and local law enforcement officers all over the United States (Devine & Capstone, 2014). The following day, state police located the suspect and arrested him and was aligned in court, where he pleaded guilty of threatening other people’s lives (Devine & Capstone, 2014).
Although the role and successes of fusion centers have been applauded by some scholars and security experts, the centers have received criticism from other scholars. According to Devine & Capstone (2014), the Boston Marathon Bombing of 2013 represents fusion center counterterrorism collapses. The failures were associated with disconnecting information sharing between local, state, and federal security agencies. Scholars have blamed the attack on the ineffective communication between the fusion centers and the intelligence communication in thwarting the bombing (Devine & Capstone, 2014). Although the Russian intelligence communicated to the FBI regarding the concern for Tamerlan’s Islamic radicalization, the FBI deemed that the attacker was not a threat and only placed him under watch (Devine & Capstone, 2014). They did not restrict his movement in and out of the United States, and the Boston Muslim community failed to report to the law enforcement officers that Tamerlan had developed radical Islamic beliefs and violet temper (Devine & Capstone, 2014). Lack of coordination and effective communication of the part of the fusion centers and the security officers contributed to the successful attack.
Additionally, other studies have criticized the fusion centers because they failed in counter-terrorism missions (Salvatore, 2018). Although these centers were primarily established to combat the ease with which potential terrorists could travel and plan their activities, including transactions, the 2013 House Majority staff report summarizes that the country has experienced five major domestic terror attacks since 2011 (Salvatore, 2018). The Orlando nightclub attack also took place in 2016 (Salvatore, 2018). The reports suggest that these centers are responsible for preventing terrorist attacks by providing intelligence information to the federal and state authorities, allowing law enforcement officers and homeland security operations to deter these kinds of crimes.
The current studies, however, fail to provide more in-depth information on how law enforcement officers utilize intelligence information offered by the fusion centers in their work of ensuring that Americans are safe. This study will bridge this gap by providing data on how the state and local law enforcement officers utilize intelligence information provided to them by the fusion centers and how critical the information is when deterring criminal and terrorist attacks.
Methodology and Research Strategy
In order to get a better insight on how local and state law enforcement officers utilize the intelligence information provided to them by the fusion centers to prevent terrorism and other criminal activities, a semi-structured interviews were conducted in Alabama State. The participants were drawn from different law enforcement agencies across the state.46 participants were selected using random sampling to obtain more scientific results that could represent the entire law enforcement team in Alabama. The participants’ age range was between 26 years and 55 years old, with 28 males and 18 females taking part in the research. The interviews were conducted in a small office in Alabama State University Police Department and lasted for approximately 2 hours. A letter of consent was sent to the head of law enforcement officers to obtain a formal and legal endorsement to conduct research with members of the law enforcement team.
The qualitative research was designed to provide the relationship that exists between the intelligence information offered by the fusion centers and law enforcement officers’ capacity to deter crime in the state using that information. These served as the dependent and independent variables in the study, respectively.
Structured questionnaires with 10 questions regarding how the law enforcement officers perceived the intelligence information provided by the Alabama Fusion center was issued to the participants. Five common crimes in the state were selected, and they included domestic crimes, terrorism, drugs/narcotics trafficking, human trafficking, and cybercrime. However, questionnaires provided limited information because each participant was required to answer, in writing, a set of structured questions.
To address the challenge of limited information posed by utilizing questionnaires as the only source of information, the questionnaires were followed by an interview. Interview questions regarding law enforcement officer’s utilization of the intelligence information offered by the fusion centers were asked. One advantage of the interview was that it provides better control over the type of information that was required in the research. Participant’s feelings, emotions, and opinions were also easily obtained through unstructured interviews.
To analyze the raw data collected in the research, data validation was done to determine whether the data collection was done as per the pre-set standards and without bias. Data editing followed where basic data checks in excel were used to ensure that the data was accurate for analysis. Finally, data coding was done where questionnaire responses were assigned values for ease analysis.
Data Analysis and Findings
Data Analysis
The data obtained from the questionnaire was coded to represent the degree to which the participants perceive the effectiveness of intelligence information provided by the fusion centers in crime prevention. The following table represents the results that were obtained.
Participants’ Perception of the Effectiveness of Intelligence Information Offered by Fusion Centers in Alabama
Number of Participants Response
6 | Very Effective |
12 | Effective |
8 | Fairly Effective |
9 | Poor |
11 | Uncertain |
Additionally, the participants’ opinions were captured in the questionnaires about the effectiveness of intelligence given by the fusion centers to prevent domestic crimes, terrorism, drug/narcotics trafficking, human trafficking, and cybercrime. The results are provided by the table below.
Participants’ Perception of the Effectiveness of Intelligence Information Offered by Fusion Centers in Alabama on the five most common Crimes
Type of Crime | Number of Participants
| Response |
Domestic Crimes
| 10 | Very Effective |
12 | Effective | |
13 | Fairly Effective | |
8 | Poor | |
3 | Uncertain | |
Terrorism
| 4 | Very Effective
|
8 | Effective
| |
11 | Fairly Effective
| |
15 | Poor
| |
8 | Uncertain | |
Drugs/Narcotics Trafficking | 12 | Very Effective
|
16 | Effective | |
8 | Fairly Effective
| |
3 | Poor
| |
7 | Uncertain | |
Human Trafficking | 13 | Very Effective
|
21 | Effective
| |
5 | Fairly Effective
| |
3 | Poor
| |
4 | Uncertain | |
Cybercrime | 8 | Very Effective
|
19 | Effective
| |
8 | Fairly Effective
| |
8 | Poor
| |
3 | Uncertain |
Unlike the questionnaires that asked the participants about their personal perception regarding the effectiveness of the intelligence provided by the fusion centers, the interviews were deeper in that they required the participants to provide information on how they or the law enforcement team, in general, have utilized the intelligence information provided by the fusion centers. The information was recorded on a book with each participant’s opinions recorded separately. Similarly, each interview responses were recorded against the crime it was addressing. All the 46 participants responded to both questionnaires and the interview questions.
Research Findings
The research found that more than half (26) of the participants perceived the intelligence information provided by the fusion centers to help law enforcement officers fight crime as fairly effective, effective, and very effective. Only 9 participants perceived the intelligence offered by these centers as poor. However, the fact that the research found 11 out of 46 participants were uncertain about the effectiveness of the intelligence provided by fusion centers presented the question that needs further research to answer. The law enforcement officers were expected to be familiar with how fusion centers operate since they were established to collaborate with the security agencies to deter crimes and protect the Americans.
In all the criminal activities selected in the research, participants’ perception of the fusion centers’ intelligence was poorly demonstrated in terrorism with 15 participants regarding it as poor. This means that most law enforcement in Alabama are in the opinion that the fusion centers do not offer adequate intelligence to the security agencies to address terrorism. However, the participants’ perception of the intelligence provided by fusion centers was positive in curbing narcotics trafficking and human trafficking. Other criminal activities such as domestic crimes and cybercrimes scored fairy in the research.
The interview questions were meant to capture the utilization of the intelligence information offered by the fusion centers to deter crime. Out of 46 participants, 39 of them reported having used the intelligence provided by the fusion centers to prevent the occurrence of one or more of the criminal activities selected. Additionally, the research noted that all participants agreed that they know of a law enforcement officer, other than themselves who have prevented one or more of the five crimes by utilizing the intelligence offered by the fusion centers.
However, more than two-thirds of the participants (34) reported that they have never utilized intelligence provided by the fusion centers to deter terrorism in their career.42 participants were found to have never known any of their colleagues in Alabama or any other state in the country who have utilized the intelligence by fusion centers to prevent terrorism from taking place. The intelligence information by the fusion centers was found to help fight human trafficking, narcotics trafficking, and deterring domestic crimes. More than three-quarters of the participants highly doubted the effectiveness of the fusion centers to offer adequate intelligence to fight terrorism and cybercrime. However, the research has proved the thesis that utilization of intelligence provided by the fusion centers enables local law enforcement officers to prevent crime. However, it is not clear how intelligence is used to prevent the country from terrorism and cybersecurity.
Conclusion
Fusion centers in the United States were integrated into law enforcement and homeland security departments following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack. These centers were established to offer intelligence information about potential terrorism to law enforcement agencies. Their focus was also broadened after the attack to help in both fight against terrorism and other domestic crimes. Since 2001, the federal and state governments have supported the growth of more fusion centers in the country to work with the security agencies to protect the Americans.
Literature has found that fusion centers are critical in preventing cybercrimes in the country by providing the federal government with centralized cybersecurity coordination and readiness to help the security agencies to prevent crimes in their jurisdictions. Again, studies have associated the absence of major terrorist attacks in the country with the intelligence that fusion centers offer to security officers to prevent crimes. The studies have further found that fusion centers have thwarted many local crimes such as the University of Illinois Shooting Plot. However, some of the studies have criticized the effectiveness of fusion centers in providing credible intelligence information to deter crimes such as the Boston Marathon Bombings of 2013.
To help answer the research question, this study was aimed to interview members of the law enforcement agencies in Alabama on how they perceive and utilize intelligence provided by fusion centers in the fight against crime. Although the effectiveness of fusion centers has been criticized by some scholars as not adequate to protect the country from terrorism and other domestic crimes, this study has answered the research question by the findings that local law enforcement officers prevent crime by utilizing the intelligence information offered to them by fusion centers.
However, future studies need to be conducted to add to the existing knowledge about the subject. The research found that a significant number of law enforcement officers were uncertain about the effectiveness of fusion centers in providing intelligence information to help in the fight against crime. More studies are needed to establish the relationship that exists between security agencies and fusion centers in the country. Additionally, further research is required to identify why it is unclear how the intelligence offered by fusion centers is used to prevent the country from terrorism and cybercrimes.