THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY DURING WORLD WAR II
Background Information
The Battle of Midway was a significant naval battle between American forces and their Japanese counterparts during the Second World War. It was the third encounter between the two parties in six months. It came one month after the Coral Sea battle and six months after the Pearl Harbor attack. The battle began on June fourth and lasted for three days up to June seventh, 1942. The defeat of the Japanese forces was a strategic victory for the Allies since it eliminated the impact of Japan in the pacific region. The effect of the defeat was a reduction in Japanese capacity to replace the losses in men and aircraft within a short time and continued with the war at the same intensity.
The Battle of the Midway was a contrast of two military strategies and capabilities. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, the Commander in Chief of US Pacific, was up against Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, the Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese Navy combined fleet. In comparison to Yamamoto complex Operation MI, Nimitz plans were to defend the Midway atoll. Operation MI had a qualitative edge. For example, Japan had six fleet carriers, namely, Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu, Soryu, Shokaku, and Zuikaku. Additionally, light carriers such as Hosho, Ryujo, Shoho, and Zuiho were available to support the activities of the fleet carriers.[1] Thus, as far as capacity was concerned, Japanese troops were better prepared for the battle than their American counterparts. However, where the U.S. navy lacked in hardware, it compensated in software through strategy and intelligence.
American naval forces won the battle of Midway because of using accurate intelligence. The American Navy succeeded in breaking the Japanese diplomatic and military communication code (JN-25) and learned in advance of impending attacks. History has judged the United States’ (U.S.) victory at Midway as the result of accurate intelligence. Although intelligence does not win battles, it has a “force multiplier” effect that allows weaker forces to perform well beyond their capacities.[2] Despite being outnumbered at the Battle of Midway, prior knowledge of the Japanese plans made it possible for the army to exploit the weaknesses of Japanese strategy. Thus, the U.S. forces were successful in repelling Japanese advances and inflicting severe damages to the forces because they had prior knowledge of the impending attack.
Japanese Strategy
Japan military leaders chose to attack Midway atoll because it was away from the American ground bases on the Hawaiian Islands. The choice was a perfect location where the ground forces stationed in Hawaii would not respond quickly to save the few forces stationed on the Island. More importantly, Midway was a strategic atoll for the United States naval forces in the Pacific region. Like all Japanese maritime planning during World War Two, the plan was elaborate, requiring the coordination of multiple groups of fighters over several miles of the open Pacific sea. The idea of its commander, Yamamoto, was on the premise that the U.S. had two carriers, namely, the USS Hornet and USS Enterprise in the Pacific region. They were aware that the U.S. had lost the USS Lexington and USS Yorktown during the Coral Sea battle. However, USS Yorktown was repaired and played a leading role in the battle. The Japanese military experts suspected that the morale of American soldiers was low, especially after the sinking of the USS Lexington among earlier.[3] What they did not know was that they had exposed their strategies through their naval code (JN-25). Thus, they were not prepared for major resistance from the U.S. navy.
Yamamoto also thought that the Japanese army could lure their American counterparts through deception by dispersing their forces to multiple units. As a result, they devised a way of concealing their battleships before the start of the battle. For example, his supporting cruises and battleships trailed Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo carrier forces by hundreds of miles. The supporting troops were to come later and destroy the remnants of U.S. forces.
The dispersal of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) troops had numerous limitations. The first one was that the dispersal meant that the multiple formations could not support each other if they came under sudden attacks. Although the advance team led by Nagumo was to bear the brunt of America counterattacks, it was not adequately equipped. It had two heavy cruisers and a light cruiser, as well as two Kongo-class fast battleships. In contrast, the supporting team had as many as five battleships, four heavy cruisers, two light carriers, and two light cruisers. Some of the vessels in the support team could keep pace with the Nagumo led group, creating weaknesses that the American forces inflict painful losses to the Japanese vessels. Therefore, the capacity of scouts carried by the carriers and cruisers were not available to Nagumo and his group.[4] Additionally, the antiaircraft capacity of the cruisers was not available to this team. Therefore, the plan of the battle began to go against the Japanese because of tactical errors, especially the deployment of vessels for the battle.
Another deviation was the Aleutian invasion into the United States by the Imperial Japanese Army. A day before the Midway attacks, the Imperial Japanese Army invaded the U.S. through the Aleutian Islands of Kiska and Attu to confuse the American defense forces. Therefore, Japan became the first country to occupy a territory of the U.S. since the 1812 war between it and the United Kingdom. The invasion could have confused the American forces about Japanese plans if it had not gathered adequate intelligence on the impending attacks. However, the plan was not successful since the Navy had credible evidence that the main target was the Midway atoll and not any other region of the United States. The operation at Aleutian was also a point of weakness of the Battle of Midway because it deprived the IJN striking forces that it could have deployed there. Thus, the IJN tried to use diversionary tactics to mislead the American forces.
The IJN made the mistake of underestimating the capability of the American forces. In the estimation of the Japanese military command, the Coral Sea fight had put Lexington and Yorktown out of action. The casualness with which the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) reduced the forces it could deploy stands in contrast with the commitment of the American Navy to improve its preparedness.[5] For example, the army worked tirelessly to retrieve Yorktown from its near-death to fighting fitness within three days for a process that would under normal circumstances take three months. The presence of Yorktown in the battle was important beyond the mathematics power of bringing the two armies close to parity. More importantly, the experience of the sailors at the Coral Sea battle was necessary for training aviators for the Midway battle.
American Strategies
Gathering credible intelligence is one of the factors that gave the American navy advantage over the Japanese forces. Intelligence gathering is a critical component of waging battle and can give an army a significant advantage. [6] However, intelligence alone cannot guarantee victory in a war. In the case of the Midway battle, America had intelligence about the impending attacks long before the war broke out. After the Pearl Harbor attack in December 1941, the American military leaders were sure that Japan would still try to attack it in the Pacific Sea to reduce its presence in the region.[7] Initial estimation showed that the Japanese would target Hawaii. However, by May 1942, Captain Joseph Rochefort of the U.S. Navy’s Combat Intelligence Unit (CIU) argued that Midway was to be the probable attack. However, the leadership of the Navy, including head of the Pacific Admiral Nimitz, thought that an attack on Midway would be diversionary. However, consistent interactions with his superiors and additional gathering of information, Joseph Rochefort, convinced them to prepare for battle in Midway.
The Battle for Midway was led by Admiral Chester W. Nimitz assisted by Rear Admiral Raymond A. Spruance commanding Enterprise and Hornet and Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, who was in charge of the carrier Yorktown. By the time the Japanese troops began their journey towards Midway, Admiral Nimitz was aware of their plans. He knew that the IJN was divided into four separate groups that could not support each other. The dispersal meant that few ships were escorting the Carrier Striking Force. Therefore, few antiaircraft weapons were protecting the carriers. Thus, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz calculated the aircraft on his three carriers as well as the support from Midway Island could counter the capacity of IJN.[8] On the other hand, the Japanese did not bother learning about the capacity of their enemies, believing that it had not recovered from the damages of the last encounter.
During the actual battle, organizational flexibility worked well for the Americans. The American carriers were divided into two groups, namely, Task Force 16, led by Rear Admiral Raymond Spruance. The two carriers, Enterprise and Hornet, were under his command. There was also Task Force 17 with the carrier Yorktown under the leadership of Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher. Although Fletcher had the overall tactical control because of his seniority, he gave Spruance space for flexibility since the latter was one of the most excellent American naval commanders during World War Two. It was one of the best decisions that brought the Battle of the Midway to an end.[9] The flexibility allowed Spruance to take risks under challenging circumstances and change the tide of the war in favor of the American naval forces.
The presence of Fletcher in the battle was essential because he was an experienced officer. His experience brought on board a person who was efficient in launching torpedo planes, dive-bombers, and fighters of the vessel’s air wing group. Fletcher’s team had the experience to arrive at the attack position at the right time by precisely following navigational calculations. The result was excellent coordination and timely delivery of bombs against Japanese vessels. However, the majority of his attacks were not successful. The majority of the scout planes returned to the Hornet without tracing the Japanese planes. However, the flexibility of some of the officers made all the difference.
The random activities of one officer changed the tide in favor of the American troops. Lieutenant commander Wade McClusky’s arrived at the expected point of interception where Nagumo was supposed to be but did not see enemy vessels. Although he has to return to refuel the tanks on the Enterprise, he continued with the search. He saw the Japanese destroyer Arashi and the position of Nagumo’s carrier group with Kaga and Akagi. The discovery changed the tide of the war in favor of American troops. Immediately after that, the Enterprise moved into attack position and bombed the Kaga and Akagi. At the same time, Yorktown dive-bombers came upon Japanese vessel Soryu destroyed its flight deck and hangar. Thus, in five minutes, the Imperial Japanese Navy lost three of its four carriers, bringing the battle at Midway to a close.[10] Although the Japanese forces tried to respond to the attacks, the tide had already changed, and more of their ships were sunk in the ensuing defense.
The Battle of Midway was an unlikely decisive victory for the American Navy against a well-equipped Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN). The success of the American Navy was possible because of several reasons. First, it was the gathering of credible intelligence. As a result, the American forces were aware of the impending attack on the Island. Secondly, the IJN made some tactical mistakes that the American troops exploited. Thirdly, the American command was flexible. As a result, an officer could continue with a search mission while they were low on fuel and change the tide of the battle in favor of America. It also allowed Fletcher to cede command Spruance to ensure that there was no disruption to American command at a critical moment.
Bibliography
Dahl, Erik J. “Why Won’t They Listen? Comparing Receptivity Toward Intelligence at Pearl Harbor and Midway.” Intelligence and National Security 28, no. 1 (2013): 68-90.
Hodge, Carl Cavanagh. “The key to midway coral sea and a culture of learning.” Naval War College Review 68, no. 1 (2015): 119-127.
Isom, Dallas Woodbury. “The Battle of Midway: Why the Japanese Lost.” Naval War College Review 53, no. 3 (2000): 60-100.
Levy, James P. “Was there something unique to the Japanese that lost them the battle of midway?” naval war college review 67, no. 1 (2014): 119-124.
Parshall, Jonathan B., and Anthony P. Tully. Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway. Potomac Books, Inc., 2005.
Siomos, Peter. “History’s judgment: Crete and Midway-comparing and contrasting two historical battles.” Journal of the Australian Institute of Professional Intelligence Officers 24, no. 3 (2016): 27.
[1] Carl Cavanagh Hodge, “The key to midway coral sea and a culture of learning,” Naval War College Review 68, no. 1 (2015): 121
[2] Peter Siomos, “History’s judgment: Crete and Midway-comparing and contrasting two historical battles,” Journal of the Australian Institute of Professional Intelligence Officers 24, no. 3 (2016): 34.
[3] James Levy, “Was there something unique to the Japanese that lost them the battle of midway?” naval war colleges review 67, no. 1 (2014): 120.
[4] Jonathan B. Parshall and Anthony P. Tully, Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway. Potomac Books, Inc., 2005.
[5] Carl Cavanagh Hodge, “The key to midway coral sea and a culture of learning,” Naval War College Review 68, no. 1 (2015): 123.
[6] Siomos, Peter, “History’s judgment: Crete and Midway-comparing and contrasting two historical battles,” Journal of the Australian Institute of Professional Intelligence Officers 24, no. 3 (2016): 27. 1040
[7] Erik J. Dahl, “Why Won’t They Listen? Comparing Receptivity Toward Intelligence at Pearl Harbor and Midway.” Intelligence and National Security 28, no. 1 (2013): 68-90.
[8] Dallas Woodbury Isom, “The Battle of Midway: Why the Japanese Lost.” Naval War College Review 53, no. 3 (2000): 61
[9] Dallas Woodbury Isom, “The Battle of Midway: Why the Japanese Lost” 61
[10] Carl Cavanagh Hodge, “The key to midway coral sea and a culture of learning,” 125