Atomic Bomb as a Diplomatic Measure
One might think that the aerial bombing on Hiroshima was a military move. Still, the decision was more of a diplomatic one, intending to mitigate the Soviet Union influence in Europe. As depicted by State Secretary, Byrnes[1] the U.S. Government had known that Japan was defeated, and the war would be over in six months. Their concern was the growing influence Russia had on Europe. Secretary Byrnes states that the acquisition and demonstration of the bomb by the U.S. would make Russia more feasible in Europe. The Soviet’s intention on joining the Japanese war could provide [2] specific difficulties to the United States. The country did not want to put itself in a position to request or begging for Soviet aid.1 Therefore, the constant need for the war to be over before the Red Army could join it because no power on earth would have kept the Soviet Union out of the war.
Like any war, there are always casualties, and Japan’s people were on the losing end of this war. [3]With 241,000 people killed, over 300,000 wounded, slightly over two million homes destroyed, and most industries dismantled, Japan’s people were unable to receive a cargo of critical items used in war. This facilitated a challenge in the survival of a major war.
Months later, after Germany had surrendered, Europe was no longer at war, the Soviet Union would make an entrance to the war on Japan but with allegiance to the allies only after their conditions were met.
To prevent future bombings across the world, [4]rules of aerial warfare needed to be drafted and adopted. These rules prohibited aerial bombing for the sole purpose of terrorizing, destroying, and damaging civilian population. Aerial bombing was only left legitimate only when aimed at a military objective, thus the need[5] to classify Hiroshima as an army base by President Truman in his radio speech to 1945. The rules further depicted that for an aerial bombing to occur, the five commanders are obliged to spare buildings dedicated to public worship, art, science, historical monuments, and hospitals. These places can never, at one point, be used for military purposes.
According to Marshal Georgii [6] in the meeting between Truman, Churchill, and Stalin, the latter was presented with the information about a new bomb that would be more destructive than any other. Churchill and many other Anglo-American authors assumed that Stalin failed to understand the significance of what was he was informed about. It was evident that the United States Government was planning to use the atomic weapon to succeed at its Imperialistic goals from a position of strength. Truman’s memoirs state that Stalin was glad to hear of the news and anticipated that they would make substantial use of it against the Japanese. Subsequently, Truman did not mention that the new weapon was an atomic bomb. After several years, Marshal Zhukov, in his memoirs, states that that night a telegram was ordered by Stalin to those working on the nuclear bomb in Russia to speed up things.
General Groves drafted the order that facilitated atomic bombs’ inclusion against the cities of Japan[7] The order was approved by then-Secretary of War, Stimson, and President Truman at Potsdam. The document informs that the targets will be one of Japan’s cities: Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata, and Nagasaki. Scientific personnel from the War Department were to be carried to observe and record the effects of the bomb explosion.
On August 9, 1945, [8] the speech delivered by President Truman from the White House classifies Hiroshima as a military base, whereby he contradicts himself since he stated that he was not aware Hiroshima was a city according to his diary entry on July 25. Upon delivering his speech, the second atomic bombing had dropped in Nagasaki, living it to ruins. Truman continues to say that the nuclear bomb was dropped on Hiroshima because it was a military base, and they intended to avoid the killing of civilians. He also warned the Japanese that aerial bombs would be dropped on their war industries if they did not surrender, and many individuals would lose their lives.[9]
Citation
Nuclear physicist Leo Szilard’s recollection of a 1945 meeting between Secretary of State James Byrnes and a group of concerned atomic scientists (1949)
Memoirs of General H. H. Arnold, Commander of the American Army Air Force in the Second World War (1949)
Dwight D. Eisenhower, recollections of a July l9th meeting with President Harry S Truman (1948)
Draft Rules of Aerial Warfare, The Hague, February 1923
Truman Speech, August 9, 1945 (excerpt)
Truman Tells Stalin, July 24, 1945
Official Bombing Order, July 25, 1945. U.S. National Archives, Record Group 77, Records of the Office of the Chief of Engineers, Manhattan Engineer District, T.S. Manhattan Project File ’42 to ’46, Folder 5B “(Directives, Memos, Etc. to and from C/S, S/W, etc.).”
[1] Nuclear physicist Leo Szilard’s recollection of a 1945 meeting between Secretary of State James Byrnes and a group of concerned atomic scientists (1949)
[2] Dwight D. Eisenhower, recollections of a July l9th meeting with President Harry S Truman (1948)
[3] Memoirs of General H. H. Arnold, Commander of the American Army Air Force in the Second World War (1949)
[4] Draft Rules of Aerial Warfare, The Hague, February 1923
[5] Truman Speech, August 9, 1945
[6] Truman Tells Stalin, July 24, 1945
[7] Official Bombing Order, July 25, 1945. U.S.
[8]Truman Speech August 9, 1945