QUESTION ONE
Neoliberals argue in favor of an unregulated market based on the belief that free markets, driven by individual self-interest and competition, lead to efficient resource allocation, economic growth, and overall societal well-being. The concept of homo economicus, or the rational economic actor, underpins this ideology. Neoliberals posit that individuals, driven by self-interest and sound decision-making, will collectively contribute to the optimal functioning of the market.
The central problem with the neoliberal conception of the subject lies in its reductionist view of human nature. By framing individuals solely as rational economic actors motivated by self-interest, neoliberals overlook the complexity of human motivations, social relationships, and non-economic aspects of life. This reductionism undermines the rich tapestry of human experiences and neglects the social and cultural dimensions that shape individuals and societies.
Marx would likely take issue with neoliberalism on several fronts. First, Marx would criticize reducing human beings to mere economic agents. In his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, Marx discusses the concept of “alienated labor,” where individuals in a capitalist system are estranged from their human essence or “species being.” According to Marx, working in a capitalist, free-market system can lead to alienation in multiple ways.
One aspect of alienation, as Marx describes, is the alienation from the product of one’s labor. In a capitalist system, workers often lack control over what they produce and how it is used. The fruits of their labor become commodities owned and controlled by capitalists, contributing to a sense of detachment from the outcome of their efforts.
Another dimension of alienation is the alienation in the labor process itself. In a profit-driven economy, work becomes a means to an end (wage) rather than an expression of one’s creative or productive capacities. This instrumentalization of labor disconnects individuals from their work’s intrinsic value and meaning.
Additionally, Marx would criticize the alienation from human potential, as individuals in a neoliberal system may be constrained by their roles as workers and consumers. The emphasis on profit maximization can limit the development and fulfillment of human capabilities beyond the narrowly defined scope of economic transactions.
In the context of neoliberalism threatening democracy, Wendy Brown’s video likely explores how prioritizing market values can erode democratic principles. The neoliberal focus on individualism, minimal government intervention, and profit-oriented decision-making may undermine collective decision-making processes and exacerbate social inequalities.
In summary, neoliberals support an unregulated market based on the belief in the efficiency of individual self-interest, as encapsulated in the concept of homo economicus. The central problem with this perspective lies in its reductionist view of human nature, neglecting the social and non-economic dimensions of life. Marx would critique neoliberalism for fostering alienation in various forms, undermining the holistic development of individuals and their connection to their “species being.” This analysis is based on the provided resources, emphasizing Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts and Wendy Brown’s insights on how neoliberalism may threaten democracy.
QUESTION TWO
In “The History of Sexuality,” Michel Foucault outlines his theory of power, which calls for a complex analysis of the relationships between power in society. He goes beyond the repressive hypothesis and introduces the idea of biopower in his critique of traditional theories of power. Foucault’s analysis revolves around disciplinary power, which is how institutions like schools, jails, and hospitals use control, normalization, and surveillance to mold people into the types they are. A normalizing society is one in which organizations set expectations for behavior and standards that people must follow, helping to create a controlled and orderly public. According to Foucault, power functions through various methods that create and manage individuals within society who dispute the oversimplified idea that it is only oppressive.
In “We Other Victorians,” Foucault analyses how the focus of the Victorian era’s discourse on sexuality shifted from overt repression to speech and surveillance. He argues that the “repressive hypothesis,” which holds that sexuality is suppressed and prohibited in society, is oversimplified. Instead, he contends that sexuality is deeply entwined with power dynamics, functioning via discourses that mould and classify people. As covered in “The Deployment of Sexuality,” the deployment of sexuality refers to the deliberate use of sexuality-related discourses by institutions as a tool for power. When sexuality is used as a weapon for normalization and surveillance, it affects how people see themselves and are seen by others. The goal is not only to suppress sexuality but also to shape it through institutional behaviors and discourse.
When Foucault presents the idea of biopower in “The Right of Death and Power over Life,” it is clear how he is changing our understanding of what power is. Here, he contends that the emphasis in contemporary society has moved from the “right of death”—the sovereign’s capacity to take a life through punishment—to a more pervasive and subtle “power over life.” Biopower manages and maximizes the health, happiness, and productivity of the entire population at the population level.
Biopower is exemplified in various state interventions such as public health policies, welfare systems, and bio-political practices. Governments, rather than focusing solely on the right to punish and kill, now exert power by regulating life itself. For instance, biopower manifests in public health campaigns, birth control policies, and vaccination programs. Governments are invested in the biological and social life of the population, seeking to manage and control it for the overall well-being and productivity of the society.
Foucault argues that biopower represents a shift from the sovereign’s direct control over life and death to a more diffuse and pervasive power that permeates the entire social body. The emphasis is on fostering life, managing populations, and ensuring productivity. This transformation highlights the evolution of power relations in modern societies, emphasizing not only the state’s authority over life but also the active involvement of individuals in their regulation through internalizing societal norms and expectations.
In conclusion, Foucault’s theory of power, disciplinary power, and biopower challenges traditional notions of repression. Disciplinary power operates through institutions and normalization, while biopower marks a transformation towards a more pervasive and constructive regulation of life. The shift from the right of death to power over life reflects the complexities of modern power dynamics, with examples such as public health policies illustrating the broader impact of biopower on society.
QUESTION THREE
Hannah Arendt’s study in “The Perplexities of the Rights of Man” focuses on the contradictory character of unalienable human rights. According to her, stateless people become less political when these rights are prioritized, which is ironic. The paradox is that protecting individuals through the declaration of universal human rights can lead to the marginalization and disregard of people who do not belong to officially recognized political communities. Arendt argues that those who are stateless are left vulnerable since they do not have the protection of a sovereign state. Since they are not acknowledged as suitable bearers in a political community, emphasizing universal rights may cause them to become less political. The idea that the very rights intended to uphold human dignity become unavailable to stateless people, leaving them open to exploitation and marginalization, demonstrates the paradox. Jacques Ranciere opposes this depoliticization in “Who is the Subject of the Rights of Man.” Ranciere contends that Arendt’s suggested depoliticization of stateless persons is unnecessary. He argues that political subjectivity can arise outside the nation-state’s borders and criticizes the notion that political agency is exclusively linked to citizenship. Ranciere questions the idea that political participation is restricted to members of established political communities.
Serena Parekh’s research on moral obligations and stateless individuals further refines this discussion. She investigates the moral implications of handling stateless people, especially in the setting of refugee camps. Parekh makes a case for a more expansive ethical framework that transcends national boundaries and emphasizes the moral obligation of the international community to attend to the needs of stateless people.
To some extent, Arendt’s concept of “a right to have rights” resolves Ranciere’s criticism. Arendt argues that having rights is a fundamental requirement for being a member of a political organization. This idea suggests that every person has an absolute right to be acknowledged as a political entity with rights, regardless of whether or not they are stateless. Ranciere, however, would still view Arendt’s insistence that political participation be a requirement for rights as restrictive.
On the other hand, Ranciere’s research implies that political subjectivity is independent of conventional ideas of citizenship. He argues that regardless of citizenship status, political agency can arise through asserting rights and claims to equality. Ranciere expands the possibilities for political activity beyond national lines and questions the standard understanding of political participation.
In conclusion, Ranciere’s critique of depoliticization based on citizenship complements Arendt’s study of the contradictions in human rights, especially as they pertain to stateless people. Parekh’s research further highlights the ethical implications of resolving the situation of stateless persons. Arendt’s concept of the “right to have rights” recognizes a fundamental right to participate in politics. Still, Ranciere’s view expands political agency by claiming that stateless people do not necessarily have to be depoliticized. The current conversation about these matters brings to light the difficulties in balancing the political realities of statelessness and fundamental human rights.
QUESTION FOUR
Franz Fanon and Alia Al-Saji analyze the strong effects of the gaze of the other and representational schemas on the corporeal schema in their analysis of the logic and phenomenology of colonization. This relationship has critical philosophical ramifications since it clarifies how colonization dehumanizes people and how oppression, perception, and representation are intertwined.
Fanon, in his seminal work “Black Skin, White Masks,” articulates the existential consequences of the gaze of the other on the black subject. According to Fanon, the gaze is a potent tool that helps racialize and objectify the black body rather than a neutral act of perceiving. In this situation, the gaze turns into an instrument of oppression, depriving the black person of subjectivity and agency. Fanon explains that the stare “locked” him in a “suffocating reification.” This suggests a procedure that turns the black person into a static, dehumanized object without any subjective experience. As explained by Fanon, the gaze of the other turns into a racialization mechanism that upholds the hierarchical institutions of colonial power.
Al-Saji’s study of the racialization of Muslim veils expands and traverses Fanon’s existential phenomenology. She highlights the connection between racial and gender oppression in “The Racialization of Muslim Veils: A Philosophical Analysis,” where she examines the phenomenon of “naturalizing gender oppression to the Muslim veil.” According to Al-Saji, the act of veiling turns into a space where another person’s gaze imposes a specific representational schema on Muslim women, limiting their autonomy and fostering stereotypes. The Muslim veil takes on a symbolic meaning that projects racialized and gendered demands, which feeds into a type of double oppression.
The philosophical significance of the relationship between the other’s gaze and the body schema comes from realizing that perception is not objective but rather is shaped by power dynamics that contribute to larger oppressive systems and influence individual subjectivity. The gaze functions as an excluding process that solidifies hierarchies and defines people into stereotypes based on gender or race.
In response to whether Fanon or Al-Saji provides a path out of the oppression and “de-subjectification” brought about by colonization, both authors raise awareness of these problems. In his writings, Fanon suggests that resisting the stifling effects of the gaze requires taking back one’s agency and fighting. He does not, however, offer a detailed liberation plan. By addressing the racialization of Muslim veils, Al-Saji advocates for an understanding of the relationship between racial and gender oppression. Although she doesn’t offer a clear answer, her writing inspires readers to challenge and reject the representational schemas that the gaze imposes on these problems.
Finally, Fanon and Al-Saji provide essential insights into how oppression, representation, and perception are intertwined within the framework of colonization. Each author emphasizes the importance of critical awareness and struggles against the dehumanizing and racializing effects of the other’s gaze. But in their writings, Fanon provides a conclusive resolution to the intricate problems of oppression and de-subjectification.
QUESTION FIVE
In feminist philosophy, Simone de Beauvoir’s claim that “One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman” has had a significant impact. In their articles, Judith Butler and Iris Marion Young address this assertion and present complex analyses of women’s experiences and the nature of gender oppression. In her work, “Throwing Like a Girl,” Iris Marion Young explores how women’s experiences are embodied. Young examines how women’s bodies are frequently perceived as limited and confined by using the term “I can” body, drawn from Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. According to Young, society’s expectations and standards impact the motions and expressions of women’s bodies. According to Young, the “I can” body represents vague transcendence and repressed intentionality. Within this paradigm, women undergo an unclear sort of transcendence that is limited by social expectations. The social conventions that dictate how women should move, act, and express themselves prevent them from working with intention. Young’s analysis thus expands on de Beauvoir’s claim by highlighting how women’s experiences are shaped by social and cultural forces that limit their agency.
In “Gender Trouble,” Judith Butler presents the idea of “gender performativity.” Butler contests the notion that gender is an innate or stable identity, arguing that gender is merely a performance that is repeated to provide the appearance of stability. Butler argues that gender is achieved through a sequence of repeated behaviors rather than something that one is. This contradicts de Beauvoir’s theory that a person becomes a woman through socialization; instead, Butler contends that people constantly act out and validate their gender identities.
Gender performativity is philosophically significant because it undermines rigid gender categories. De Beauvoir’s theory that gender is a social construct is supported by Butler’s emphasis on the performative aspect of gender. Still, Butler goes a step further and claims that the concept of a stable gender identity itself is false. Thus, gender performativity challenges conventional binary classifications and permits a more flexible view of gender.
One could argue that rather than relying primarily on phenomenology, Butler’s emphasis on gender performativity relies more on Michel Foucault’s understanding of power. Butler discusses Foucault’s theories of power and speech, while de Beauvoir and Young use phenomenology to examine the bodily realities of women. Butler’s research into how gender norms are created and sustained by recurring behaviors and discourses is influenced by Foucault. Butler’s emphasis on gender’s performative elements is consistent with Foucault’s theory that power is distributed and ingrained in social practices.
In conclusion, Young and Butler both expand on de Beauvoir’s claim and offer more in-depth analyses of how women are subjected to power. While Butler undermines conventional ideas of gender identity, Young’s exploration of the “I can” body highlights the embodied limitations on women’s agency. Butler’s focus on performativity and power shows how feminist philosophers deal with and build upon basic notions to comprehend and combat gender oppression. This is in line with Foucault’s theories rather than phenomenology.