CHAPTER FOUR:  DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

4.1  Stage I: A questionnaire survey analysis.

4.1.1        Demographic characteristics

The analysis whose findings are presented in this study involved 61 (69.3%) ‘Non-managerial staff’ and 27(30.7%) managers (See figure 4.1). As shown in Appendix 1, the managers consisted of several individuals in leadership and supervisory positions, such as the managers, leaders, and supervisors. The ‘others’ category included various technical engineers who executed duties under supervision, namely electrical engineers, IT engineers, and oil and gas engineers, officers, workers, to name a few.

Figure 4. 1: Participants job description                                  N=88

The other demographic features of the respondents are shown in Table 4.1. Most spoken language was English (55.4%, n=51), followed by Arabic (38%, n=35). The majority of the people surveyed (58.7%, n=54) worked in the private sector. The total working experience of the 88 participants was 518 years (SD=6.977).

Table 4. 1: Demographic characteristics of the respondents

4.2  Reliability test results for each Dimension.

There were 11 multi-item dimensions used to assess the Zero Accident Vision status of various organizations. The internal consistency within each subscale was calculated, and the results are shown in Table 4.2. Note that all the items within the 11 constructs (except dimensions 5 & 10) were highly reliable (i.e., Cronbach’s α >0.7). Dimensions 5 ‘Management safety justice subscale’ consisted of 3 items (α=0.46), and 10 ‘Safety resilience subscale’ with two items (α=0.56) had weak internal consistency. was It probably because there were fewer items in the said subscales. Given that the number of items in a scale influence reliability, adding relevant attributes may increase the inter-item reliability of the dimensions (Cohen et al., 2007; Polit & Beck, 2004). Otherwise, results arising from such scales should be interpreted with caution.

Table 4. 2 Reliability test results (internal consistency items in of each Dimension)

4.3  Data analysis- managers and ‘others.’

There were 11 multi-item dimensions used to assess the Zero Accident Vision status of various organizations. The internal consistency within each subscale was calculated, and the results are shown in Table 4.2. Note that all the items within the 11 constructs (except dimensions 5 & 10) were highly reliable (i.e., Cronbach’s α >0.7). Dimensions 5 ‘Management safety justice subscale’ consisted of 3 items (α=0.46), and 10 ‘Safety resilience subscale’ with two items (α=0.56) had weak internal consistency. It was because there were fewer items in the said subscales. Given that the number of items in a scale influence reliability, adding relevant attributes may increase the inter-item reliability of the dimensions (Cohen et al., 2007; Polit & Beck, 2004). Otherwise, results arising from such scales should be interpreted with caution.

Table 4. 3 The dimensions statistics managers and ‘other than managers’

4.3.1        The results for each attribute (for managers and ‘others’)

4.3.2         Attributes within the individual Dimension (D1)

Generally, as presented in Table 4.3, on D1 Dimension, the respondents (managers and ‘others’) felt that there was a highly individual commitment to ZAV in the organizations surveyed (mean=3.5500, SD=0.49942). Each of the individual attributes in this Dimension had favorable scores ranging from 3.2 to 3.7 (Figure 4.2). The aspects under survey were; ‘D1.1 I think that all accidents (injury-people and damage to objects) can be prevented, D1.2 I am personally committed to a zero-accident vision (preventing all accidents – injury to people and damage to objects).  D1.3 I am willing to do the best to accomplish zero (prevent all) accidents in our workplace, D1.4. I think that everyone bears personal responsibility for the health and safety of others and D1.5 I think that safety performance can always be improved.

Figure 4. 2  The scores of individual Dimension attributes for managers & ‘others’

4.3.3        Attributes within the Communication Management Dimension (D2)

On aggregate, managers and ‘others’ stated that the Management was committed to communication on safety (mean=3.0739, SD=.71985). The responses on each attribute for D2 Dimension are shown in figure 4.3. However, there was the inadequate evaluation of the organization on the following three issues (with a range of 2.91 to 2.97): D2.4 Management communicates a clear and positive safety vision of the future; D2.6 Management regularly communicates safety issues to employees; D2.7 Management’s words and actions match in making our workplace safe.

Figure 4. 3  Scores of management Communication dimension attributes-managers & ‘others.’

4.3.4        Attributes within the Communication-Individual Dimension (D3)

On average, the managerial and non-managerial participants portrayed excellent individual communication (mean=3.0412, SD=.68876). Seven items (See figure 4.4) attracted a score of > 3.0, viz.; D3.3, I received sufficient safety information regarding my work, D3.4 I regularly talk about safety with my peers. D3.5 I can openly give feedback to my peers about safety issues. D3.6 I can openly give feedback to my Management about safety issues, and D3.8 I know what I need to do to accomplish zero (prevent all) accidents in our workplace. Regrettably, the statements ‘D3.1 I regularly receive feedback on my safety performance’, ‘D3.2 I received well-timed information about safety issues’, and ‘D3.7 I am informed about safety issues that are experienced in other departments’ scored ≤3.0. These aspects, therefore, negatively affected individual communication posture.

Figure 4. 4 Communication-Individual Dimension Attributes-Managers & ‘Others’

4.3.5        Attributes within management safety priority Dimension (D4)

The combined survey (Managers and others) revealed that, generally, Management does not prioritize safety (mean=2.8081, SD=0.66640). The results for each attribute are shown in (figure 4.5. There were 5 out of 6 aspects that registered a poor score- a minimum of 2.1 and a maximum of 2.9. These are; that Management looks the other way when someone is careless with safety (D4.2); Management puts production before safety (D4.3). Management does not accept employees taking risks when the work schedule is tight (D4.4), the worry that whenever there is a conflict between safety and productivity, employees are rarely advised to work safely (D4.5). Management neither empowers them to make safety decisions, nor is their trust between subordinates and their managers to allow reporting of safety issues (D4.6). Lastly, there was discontent among most employees since Management did not provide encouragement and recognition to employees who work safely (D4.7). These were the issues of concern.

Figure 4. 5. Management safety Priority dimension attributes-managers & ‘others.’

4.3.6        Attributes within management safety justice Dimension (D5)

There were three issues under consideration in this construct; that is, whether the Management blames employees for accidents (D5.1), if Management treats employees involved in an accident fairly (D5.2) and whether Management looks for causes, but a not guilty person, whenever an accident occurs (D5.3).  The respondents’ scores were all below 3, with the highest being 2.7 and the lowest 2.2 (Figure 4.6).  It suggests that there was consensus feeling among managers and ‘others’ that the Management blames employees in case of accidents, does not treat the employees fairly whenever mishaps happen, and that Management looks for a guilty person in case of accidents, instead of looking for the root cause.

Figure 4. 6 Management safety justice dimension attributes-managers & ‘others.’

4.3.7        Attributes within safety empowerment Dimension (D6)

The focus of the sixth Dimension was respondents’ perceived safety empowerment within the organizations they worked in (Figure 4.7). The respondents returned an adverse verdict in 4 out of the six aspects, which are; that Management provides everyone an equal opportunity to influence safety in the workplace (D6-1), the involvement of employees in decisions regarding safety (D6.2), organizations encourage employees to suggest safety ideas (D6.5) if organizations factored in workers’ suggestions to improve safety (D6.6). The lowest and highest scores in the above attributes are 2.7 and 2.8, respectively.

Figure 4. 7 Safety empowerment dimension attributes-managers & ‘others’

4.3.8        Attributes within ‘learning from incident actions’ Dimension (D7)

There was a felt gap in this Dimension because all the attributes were rated poorly (Min=2.7 and Max=2.9). It, therefore, suggests that near-miss incidents are not investigated (D7.1), there is minimal prioritization and follow up in safety events (D7.2), safety actions after incidents are rarely followed up as planned (D7.3), and evaluation of the effectiveness of safety actions after incidents is rare (D7.5).

Figure 4. 8 Learning from incidents actions attributes-managers & ‘others’

4.3.9        Attributes within the ‘safety climate group’ Dimension (D8)

The areas of concern in this scale t scored between 2.1 and 2.9 (Figure 4.9).  These are the attributes: D8.4 We who work here break safety rules in order to complete work on time. D8.5 We who work here consider minor accidents (injury-people & damage-objects) as a regular part of our daily work. D8.6 We who work here seldom talk about safety; D8.7 If we have to deviate from safety rules, we make sure we still work safely. D8.8 Before a job is started, there is always an awareness of all the safety problems that may arise.

Figure 4. 9 safety climate-group attributes-managers & ‘others’

4.3.10    Attributes within ‘learning conditions’ Dimension (D9)

The items that were evaluated negatively in this subscale had the highest score of 2.9 (Figure 4.10). These are: D9.2 Management is always looking for ways to improve safety – even if no incident (accident or near-miss) has taken place. D9.3 In my workplace, we look at lessons learned from accidents in other organizations and adopt useful examples from them.D9.4 The organization has systems (documentation, databases, etc.) to retain lessons learned from the past; and D9.7In our organization we learn from near-misses.

Figure 4. 10 Learning Conditions Attributes-Managers & ‘Others’

4.3.11    Attributes within ‘safety resilience’ Dimension (D10)

The safety resilience dimension had two items. The attributes registered lowest and highest ratings of 2.5 and 2.7, respectively (Figure 4.11).  Respondents were of the view that companies were neither prepared for unexpected events (D10.1), nor could they quickly recover from the said events (D10.2).

Figure 4. 11 Safety Resilience Attributes-Managers & ‘Others’

4.3.12    Attributes within ‘safety-health preventive interaction’ Dimension (D11)

Two items in this scale recorded poor scores: We in our workplace have the tools to prevent all work-related disease/illness (D11.4) and We in our workplace regard all work-related disease/illness as preventable (D11.3)

Figure 4. 12 safety-health preventive interaction attributes-managers & ‘others.’

4.4  Aggregated data analysis – Managers vs. Engineers-others

This section compares the results of the managers and the ‘others’ (engineers) on their experiences regarding the Zero accident vision (ZAV) status of the organizations they work . Managers essentially create policies for the ‘others’ to implement.  As shown in Table 4.4, both categories of staff (Managers and ‘others’) agreed that there was a gap in two dimensions: management safety justice and the safety resilience dimensions. However, it observed that respondents in managerial positions evaluated 10 out of the 11 dimensions of the ZAV positively (Table 4.4). Conversely,  engineers,  involved in the implementation of the safety measures had rated the organizations negatively on all the dimensions except D1 (individual commitment to ZAV). Therefore, it can be concluded that managers were more positive than their juniors in their assessment of the ZAV status of the companies they led.  It is on this backdrop that the subsequent section delves into the engineers’ evaluation of the safety aspects and the stated gaps impeding their implementation of safety measures where they work.

Table 4. 4 Aggregated data analysis – Managers vs. Engineers-others

4.5  Data analysis – Engineers (others) only.

4.5.1        Attributes within the individual Dimension (D1) – Engineers (Others) only

The engineers on the ground believed that they were individually committed to the ZAV project. Each of the individual attributes in this Dimension had a favorable score ranging from 3.1 to 3.7 (Figure 4.13). The aspects under survey were; ‘D1.1 I think that all accidents (injury-people and damage to objects) can be prevented. D1.2  I am personally committed to a zero-accident vision (preventing all accidents – injury to people and damage to objects). D1.3 I am willing to do my best to accomplish zero (prevent all) accidents in our workplace, D1.4.I think that everyone bears personal responsibility for the health and safety of others and D1.5 I think that safety performance can always be improved is the only Dimension that registered a total positive score among the engineers.

Figure 4. 13  The scores of individual Dimension attributes- ‘others’ only

4.5.2        Attributes within the Communication Management Dimension (D2)- ‘others’ only

The responses on each attribute for D2 Dimension are shown in (figure 4.14). Negative ratings were noted in the following six issues under survey:  We receive regular feedback regarding our company’s safety performance (D2.2); Management communicates safety goals (D2.3); Management communicates a clear and positive safety vision of the future (D2.4); Management talks openly about safety issues (D2.5); Management regularly communicates safety issues to employees (D2.6), and Management’s words and actions match in making our workplace safe (D2.7). These elements had a minimum rating of 2.7 and the highest of 2.97.

Figure 4. 14:  Management Communication Dimension Attributes-‘Others’ Only

4.5.3        Attributes within the Communication (Individual) Dimension (D3) – Others only

The individuals who were in non-managerial positions had concerns regarding the following four issues in this subscale (figure 4.15); receiving regular feedback on their safety performance (D3.1); getting timely information about safety issues 9D3.2).  Being informed about safety issues that are experienced in other departments 9D3.7), and Knowledge of what needs to be done to accomplish zero (prevent all) accidents in their workplace 9D3.8). All the attributes attracted scores ranging from 2.59 to 3.21.

Figure 4. 15 Communication-Individual Dimension Attributes- ‘Others’ Only

4.5.4        Attributes within management safety priority Dimension (D4)-‘others’ only

The survey of ‘others’ suggested that Management does not prioritize safety. The results for each attribute are shown in figure 4.16. Employees had terrible experiences in most attributes in this domain. The issues that worried this category of staff drew a minimum of 2.1 and a maximum of 2.9 in evaluation.  These are: Management looks the other way when someone is careless with safety (D4.2); Management puts safety before production (D4.3); Management accepts employees taking risks when the work schedule is tight (D4.4); If there is a conflict between safety and productivity I have been advised to work safely (D4.5); Employees are fully empowered to take safety decisions- juniors trust their superiors(D4.6); Management provides encouragement and recognition to employees who work safely(D4.7); Management listens carefully to all who have been involved in an accident (D4.8), and Management knows what to do to make the workplace safe (D4.9)

Figure 4. 16 Management Safety Priority Dimension Attributes- ‘Others’

4.5.5        Attributes within management safety justice Dimension (D5)-‘Others’ only

There were three issues under consideration in this Dimension, i.e., whether the Management blames employees for accidents (D5.1), if Management treats employees involved in an accident fairly (D5.2) and whether Management looks for causes, but a not guilty person, whenever an accident occurs (D5.3).  The respondent’s scores were all below three, with the highest being 2.62 and the lowest 2.25 (Figure 4.17).  It suggests technical staff felt that Management blames employees in case of accidents, does not treat the employees fairly whenever mishaps happen, and that Management looks for a guilty person in case of accidents, instead of looking for the root cause.

Figure 4. 17 Management safety justice dimension attributes-‘others’ only.

4.5.6        Attributes within safety empowerment Dimension (D6)-Others only.

The focus of the sixth Dimension was the experience of respondents on safety empowerment within the organizations they worked in (Figure 4.18). The engineers returned an adverse verdict in all the six aspects under consideration, namely; that Management provides everyone an equal opportunity to influence safety in the workplace (D6-1). Management involves employees in decisions regarding safety (D6.2); employees are encouraged to communicate with colleagues about safety in the workplace (D6.3). Employees have enough possibilities to communicate safety with Management (D6.4), the organizations encourage employees to suggest safety ideas (D6.5), and organizations factored in workers’ suggestions to improve safety (D6.6). The lowest and highest scores in the above elements are 2.61 and 2.92, respectively.

Figure 4. 18 Safety Empowerment Dimension Attributes- ‘Others’

4.5.7        Attributes within ‘learning from incident actions’ Dimension (D7)- ‘others’

As presented in Figure 4.19, all the aspects of this facet were appraised dismally (Min=2.57 and Max=2.77). It, therefore, suggests that near-miss incidents are not investigated (D7.1), there is minimal prioritization and follow up in safety events (D7.2), safety actions after incidents are rarely followed up as planned (D7.3), there is evaluation of the effectiveness of safety actions after incidents are rare (D7.4), and existing safety practices and procedures are reviewed after an accident/incident (D7.5).

Figure 4. 19 Learning from incidents actions attributes- ‘others’ only

4.5.8        Attributes within the ‘safety climate group’ Dimension (D8)-Others only.

The points of concern in this safety climate (group) Dimension that need to be addressed were scored between 2.0 and 2.98 (Figure 4.20). The issues focused on D8.4 We who work here break safety rules in order to complete work on time; D8.5 We who work here consider minor accidents (injury-people & damage-objects) as a regular part of our daily work. D8.6 We who work here seldom talk about safety; D8.7 If we have to deviate from safety rules we make sure we still work safely; D8.8 Before a job is started, there is always an awareness of all the safety problems that may arise, and D8.13 We who work here always discuss safety issues when such issues come up.

Figure 4. 20, safety climate-group attributes-‘others.’

4.5.9        Attributes within the ‘learning conditions’ Dimension (D9)-‘others’ only.

The matters that were assessed negatively had the highest score of 2.92 and the lowest value of 2.74 (Figure 4.21). These are: D9.2 Management is always looking for ways to improve safety – even if no incident (accident or near-miss) has taken place. D9.3 In my workplace, we look at lessons learned from accidents in other organizations and adopt useful examples from them. D9.4 The organization has systems (documentation, databases) to retain lessons learned from the past.  D9.7 In our organization, we learn from near-misses; and D9.8 In our organization, we periodically evaluate our safety activities in order to improve safety further.

Figure 4. 21 learning conditions attributes-‘others.’

4.5.10    Attributes within ‘safety resilience’ Dimension (D10)-‘others.’

The engineers had a poor experience with regards to the safety resilience dimension. This Dimension was assessed using two items (Figure 4.22), with a minimum and highest ratings of 2.64 and 2.39, respectively.  Respondents were of the view that they were neither prepared for unexpected events (D10.1) nor could they quickly recover from the said events (D10.2).

Figure 4. 22 Safety Resilience Attributes-‘Others’

4.5.11    Attributes within ‘safety-health preventive interaction’ Dimension (D11)- ‘others’

The engineers on the ground returned a contrary verdict in all the items of this core aspect of ZAV (Figure 4.23).  The scores ranged between 2.43 and 2.90. The engineers suggested that the workplace was not committed to implementing measures that reduce work-related disease/illness (D11.1). Management was not actively engaged in the prevention of work-related disease/illness (D11.2). The workers do not regard all work-related disease/illness as preventable (D11.3), and that workers do not have the tools to prevent all work-related disease/illness (D11.4).

Figure 4.23 Safety-Health Preventive Interaction Attributes-‘Others’

4.6  Summary of the aggregated data analysis

The managers were positive in their assessment of the workplace ZAV status compared to engineers in the non-managerial positions. The engineers had a negative experience in 10 out of 11 dimensions, as opposed to 2 domains negatively assessed by the managers. The two groups had a consensus that ‘management safety justice (D5)’ and ‘organizational safety resilience (D10) were of concern.